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THE POLITICS OF CANCER.* By Samuel S. Epstein. San Fran-
cisco: Sierra Club Books. 1978. Pp. 583. $12.50. 
If one thousand people died every day of cholera, swine flu, or food 
poisoning, an epidemic of major proportions would be at hand and 
the entire country would mobilize against it. Yet cancer claims 
that many lives daily, often in prolonged and agonizing pain, and 
most people believe they can do nothing about it. . . . 
But cancer has distinct, identifiable causes. . . . It can 
largely be prevented, but this requires more than just scientific 
effort or individual action. The control and prevention of cancer 
will require a concerted national effort. This book is offered as a 
contribution to that essentially political process. [P. l] 
With these opening words, Dr. Epstein sets forth the themes 
of The Politics of Cancer. Cancer is largely a man-made (read, 
industry-made) epidemic, and thus can be prevented by man. 
But the public does not know that cancer is preventable, industry 
resists reform and manipulates facts and fears, and the epidemic 
continues. Because much of the battle against that epidemic is 
being fought in legal forums, its saga, and therefore this book, is 
of special concern to lawyers. 
The Politics of Cancer has three major parts. Part I, "The 
Science of Cancer," explains the basic scientific methods of de-
termining whether a substance is carcinogenic. One method is 
epidemiological study, the statistical search for "characteristics 
common to those contracting" cancer (p. 38). Such studies have 
the advantage of being "as close as we can reasonably get to 
performing actual experiments on humans" (p. 38), but it is diffi-
cult to gather data on enough victims of a particular type of 
cancer to draw meaningful conclusions. A single type of cancer 
strikes only a small proportion of the population, and a long 
period usually separates contact with the carcinogen and the 
onset of the disease. Another difficulty with this method is 
"sorting out the relevant from the irrelevant" (p. 41). Sometimes 
there are synergistic effects between two factors, and at other 
times a harmless factor merely coincides with a carcinogen. The 
asbestos industry, for example, has argued that epidemiological 
studies show only that smoking and contact with asbestos to-
gether, but not that contact with asbestos alone, cause cancer. 
The second method of determining carcinogenicity is to test 
the suspect substance on animals. This method has the advan-
tage of enabling researchers to use precise controls. Its major 
* This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Reuiew. 
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difficulty is that researchers must jump from a conclusion of car-
cinogenicity in animals to one of carcinogenicity in humans. This 
"species-to-species extrapolation" (p. 57) has been repeatedly 
challenged by industry, but Epstein avers, with citations, that 
"[t]his inference rests on over half a century of intensive scien-. 
tific investigation into the biology and chemistry of carcinogene-
sis and carcinogens in many organisms, including humans" (p. 
57). A second difficulty with animal tests is that many people 
misunderstand the reasons for giving animals large doses. "The 
superficial absurdity of a rat consuming the human equivalent of 
about a thousand cans of diet soda per day ... has been ex-
ploited by industry, misinterpreted by the press, and misunder-
stood by the lay public, which has come to believe that anything 
given in large enough doses will cause cancer in animals. This 
simply is not true" (pp. 64-65). Epstein explains that high doses 
are needed because "(1) ... some carcinogens are much less 
potent than others and (2) . . . animal experiments, no matter 
how well planned, must make use of finite animal resources" (p. 
65). These difficulties do not mean that inferring carcinogenicity 
from animal studies is improper, but they do make it impossible 
to predict from animal data a safe level of human contact. If a 
substance is carcinogenic, the only level known to be safe is no 
contact at all. 
In Part II, "The Science and Politics of Cancer," Epstei_n 
details twelve "case studies" of various carcinogens. These stud-
ies compose the heart of the book not only because they consume 
over half the textual pages, but also because the more general 
discussions in Parts I and ill draw heavily on them. Each study 
recites how the basic scientific evidence of carcinogenicity was 
obtained, how industry attempted to suppress or rebut that evi-
dence, and how the government responded to the pressures of 
workers, consumers, industry, or public-interest groups. Epstein 
investigates four carcinogens that exist primarily in the work-
place: asbestos, vinyl chloride (a major chemical in the produc-
tion of plastics), benzene (used to manufacture tires and many 
other products), and bischloromethylether (used in water purifi-
cation and nuclear fuel fabrication). He also examines five car-
cinogens that appear in consumer products: tobacco, red dyes #2 
and #40, saccharin, acrylonitrile (found in plastic bottles) and 
female sex hormones (used in contraceptives, for gynecological 
problems, and as an additive to animal feed). Finally, he reviews 
three carcinogens present in the general environment: aldrin/ 
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dieldrin and chlordane/heptachlor (both pesticides) and nitro-
samines (an extensive group of chemicals found in air, food, and 
water). 
A typical case study is that of vinyl chloride. Epstein briefly 
explains how polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is made from vinyl chlor-
ide, a process that leaves some unreacted vinyl chloride in the 
polyvinyl-chloride resin. Those tens of thousands of workers who 
subsequently handle the plastips can be exposed to this trapped 
vinyl chloride as the PVC is heated or dissolved. Epstein traces 
the industry's reaction to evidence that vinyl chloride might be 
carcinogenic. In 1970, an Italian researcher reported, at an inter-
national cancer congress, that rats exposed to vinyl chloride de-
veloped a wide range of cancers. Disturbed by the report, a con-
sortium of European chemical companies financed a further 
study by another Italian researcher who confirmed the earlier 
results and showed vinyl chloride to be a potent carcinogen. In 
January 1973, the major trade association for the United States 
chemical industry learned of the study's results, but only after 
agreeing not to disclose them without the consortium's consent. 
During that year, the association participated in proceedings with 
both the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) about 
the safety of vinyl chloride, but it never disclosed the Italian 
results to either agency. Not until 1974, when B.F. Goodrich an-
nounced the cancer-induced deaths of three of its PVC workers, 
did the association reveal, on the same day as the Goodrich an-
nouncement, the findings of the Italian study, now eighteen 
months old. 
As the danger became apparent, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) reduced the permissible con-
centration of vinyl chloride in the workplace from 500 parts per 
million to 50 parts per million, and later to 1 part per million. The 
chemical industry continue~ to distort data on the carcinogenic-
ity of vinyl chloride {p. 104). It also protested that the OSHA 
standards were prohibitively expensive, and it commissioned 
studies, which predicted increased costs of up to ninety billion 
dollars, to support its claims. OSHA refused to back down, and 
within a year the companies had, with only minimal difficulties, 
complied with the standard. This kind of distortion by affected 
industries is, regrettably, typical of that found in each of Ep-
stein's case studies, although in many cases industry enjoys more 
success in obtaining lax standards. 
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In Part ill, "The Politics of Cancer," Epstein describes the 
major organizations that shape cancer policy. He first works 
through the tangled thicket of relationships among the innumera-
ble government agencies: the major research agencies (the Na-
tional Cancer Institute, the National Institutes of Health, 
NIOSH, the National Institute for Environmental Health Sci-
ences, the National Center for Toxicological Research, the Energy 
Research and Development Administration, the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality) and the major regulatory agencies (OSHA, 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the Department of Agriculture, the 
FDA, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Bureau of Mines). 
He analyzes some of the agencies' budgets, describes their con-
flicting goals and procedures, lists major agency regulations, and 
sketches possible reforms (some of which are described below). 
In the next chapter, Epstein unabashedly criticizes industry 
for "fail[ing] to adequately comprehend the magnitude of health 
and safety problems entailed in the manufacture and handling of 
hazardous, particularly toxic or carcinogenic, chemicals" (p. 
389). Drawing generalizations from the case studies of Part II, 
Epstein summarizes the industrial "strategies" used to support 
the status quo: By controlling information and propagandizing 
the public, industry discounts the hazards of its products and 
shifts the blame from the chemicals to "hypersusceptible" vic-
tims (p. 395). Industry attempts to influence policy through 
lobbying and to exhaust the agencies through protracted legal 
actions and by insisting on impossible precision in carcinogenesis 
tests. Finally, if it finds regulations too strict, industry threatens 
to move overseas or to southern states, where standards are more 
lenient. 
Epstein closes the chapter with briefer descriptions of labor's 
efforts to secure healthier working conditions, the public-interest 
movement's efforts to prod government to regulate carcinogens 
more strictly, and the often admirable American Cancer Society's 
indifference, if not hostility "to regulatory needs ... in the gen-
eral environment and workplace" (p. 426). He concludes with a 
chapter entitled "What You Can Do to Prevent Cancer." 
Of the many innovative ideas in The Politics of Cancer, four 
themes have particularly interesting policy overtones. First, Ep-
stein calls for a reorganization of the diverse government agencies 
and programs. For example, he proposes that the National Can-
cer Institute be insulated from direct presidential influence by 
restoring it to the administrative control of the National Insti-
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tutes of Health, and he suggests that the political visibility of 
NIOSH (whose work Epstein praises) be increased by allowing 
it to report directly to the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW). The Carter administration is already attempt-
ing to coordinate the agencies better by forming an Interagency 
Regulatory Liaison Group representing the EPA, the OSHA, the 
FDA, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission and by 
establishing the EPA Toxic Substances Strategy Committee, 
which reports directly to the President. Epstein applauds such 
attempts, and he urges even greater coordination among agen-
cies. 
A second idea of Epstein's addresses a more specific disad-
vantage of inefficient regulatory procedures. Whenever an agency 
proposes to regulate an alleged carcinogen, major battles are 
fought over what constitutes adequate proof of carcinogenicity. If 
the agencies could all endorse a set of general scientific principles, 
the regulatory process would be more efficient. Epstein vividly 
depicts the wasted effort of duplicate hearings by recounting the 
EPA proceedings to ban the pesticides aldrin/dieldrin and, later, 
chlordane/heptachlor. In the first action, the EPA counsel formu-
lated nine general principles of cancer research, including the 
principles that a chemical's capacity to induce benign or malig-
nant tumors should suffice to characterize it as a carcinogen; that 
the concept of a safe "threshold" exposure level has no practical 
significance; and that a carcinogenic agent can be identified by 
animal tests or properly conducted epidemiological studies. Ac-
cording to Epstein, the administrative law judge and the review-
ing EPA administrator implicitly incorporated those nine princi-
ples in the decision to suspend aldrin/dieldrin. Nevertheless, 
when the hearings on chlordane/heptachlor began, the principles 
again became "the salient point of contention" (p. 267). Such 
repetitious debates over basic scientific principles in every indi-
vidual hearing waste time and money. If generally-agreed-upon 
principles were developed (perhaps through agency rule-making, 
although Epstein suggests no specific procedure), individual 
hearings could concentrate on, and presumably determine more 
quickly, the carcinogenicity of the chemical in question. 
Third, Epstein proposes that government and private re-
searchers more strongly emphasize the prevention of cancer. Tra-
ditional research has searched primarily for cures, but Epstein, 
pointing to the very modest increase in survival rates that re-
search has achieved, contends that "there has been little overall 
improvement in our ability to treat and cure most cancers" (p. 
328). Researchers could better spend their energy, Epstein there-
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fore suggests, in trying to prevent cancer in the first place: re-
search into the causes of cancer, through animal tests and epide-
miological studies, would further the ability to eliminate the 
many carcinogens that man places in the environment. 
Fourth, Epstein devotes an entire chapter to outlining how 
industry can improve its production of and response to research 
and data. Most benefit and risk data come from industry, and 
those data are often flawed. Academic researchers hired by indus-
try as consultants are often biased, and industry will emphasize 
favorable results even from poorly conducted studies while ignor-
ing unfavorable conclusions from better studies. If tests on ani-
mals suggest a chemical is a carcinogen, industry claims that only 
tests on humans are meaningful, yet industry loudly proclaims 
negative carcinogenic findings from animal tests. 
The answer lies not, says Epstein, in having industry build 
more elaborate carcinogenic testing facilities. Nor will the agen-
cies' current practice of formalizing guidelines and inspections, 
improving audits and licensing, and increasing fines for manipu-
lating or suppressing data alleviate the inherent conflict of inter-
est industry confronts when made to test the carcinogenicity of 
its products. Rather, Congress should set a buffer between the 
researcher and the manufacturer. A disinterested advisory group, 
Epstein believes, should receive requests from manufacturers for 
testing a chemical and should distribute research contracts 
through competitive bids. After the study, the advisory group 
should comment on the quality of the research and forward its 
recommendations to the appropriate agency. Not only would the 
public and industry benefit from improved research, but, argues 
Epstein, industry would be protected from legal liability if the 
tests did not predict a product's carcinogenicity. 
The Politics of Cancer is an important book because it brings 
together the scientific, political, and social ramifications of the 
many types of cancers. It suffers, 'perhaps inevitably in so great 
a task, from an inconsistent tone, one which ranges from that of 
a detached scientist explaining the value and limitations of ani-
mal tests, through that of an academic decrying the distortion of 
data and the misunderstanding of legitimate inference, to that of 
an advocate castigating industry. for hammering the public with 
propaganda and the President for weighing political expediency 
against 300,000 deaths annually from tobacco. Perhaps the book's 
most disturbing characteristic is its treatment of -industry as a 
monolithic whole (as indicated by its use of the· singular form 
"industry" to mean "private business" or "manufacturing com-
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panies"). Epstein's documentary evidence against many manu-
facturing firms is convincing, but perhaps would be more compel-
ling if he did not assume that all industry acts in recalcitrant 
unison to oppose cancer prevention. 
Epstein, who is a medical doctor and a Professor of Occupa-
tional and Environmental Medicine at the School of Public 
Health of the University of Illinois at the Medical Center, Chi-
cago, is strongest in explaining medical research: his most de-
tailed references in the thirty-eight pages of endnotes are from 
medical literature. As an experienced member of advisory com-
missions and panels, Epstein also documents well the govern-
ment's struggle to cope with technical and scientific material. 
Thus, despite any flaws, Dr. Epstein's book will surely be a wel-
come and important influence on the politics of cancer. 
